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Abstract
Rejectivism is one of the most influential embodiments of pragmatism 
within contemporary philosophy of logic, advancing an explanation of 
the meaning of a logical notion, negation, in terms of the speech act 
of denial. This paper offers a challenge to rejectivism by proposing 
that in virtue of explaining negation in terms of denial, the rejectivist 
ought to be able to explain the concept of contradiction partially in 
terms of denial. It is argued that any failure to achieve this constitutes 
an explanatory failure on the part of rejectivism, and reasons are then 
provided to doubt that the challenge can be successfully met.
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1 Negation and denial
The predominant view in the philosophy of logic that one denies a 
proposition just when one asserts its negation has its genesis in the 
work of Frege, where logic is understood to be the study of inference, 
what one is permitted to infer given their commitments, rather than 
that of implication:
To make a judgment because we are conscious of other truths as pro-
viding a justification is known as inferring. There are laws governing 
this kind of justification, and to set up these laws of correct inference 
is the goal of logic. (Frege 1979: 3)
Conceiving of logic as an account of inference requires a philosophi-
cal concern for whether the premises at hand have been asserted, 
and thus are suitable to be used for inferences (Frege 1980: 16-17). 
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A concern evident in Frege’s own calculus in the Begriffsschrift, where 
the judgement stroke is used to communicate whether the premises 
in question have been asserted or not.
With this inferential conception of logic, and premises conceived 
of as asserted propositions, it is little surprise that Frege (1960) 
proposed an intimate relationship between the speech act of denial 
and negation. After all, if propositional variables in a logic are un-
derstood in terms of an individual’s commitments, it is reasonable 
that the truth-reversing truth-functor negation should communicate 
an individual’s denial of the negated proposition. For Frege (1960), 
however, assertion was the primary speech act, and thus the denial 
of a proposition p was always explained in terms of the assertion of 
p’s negation.
While Frege’s general inferential conception of logic is no longer 
popular, his theory on the relationship between negation and denial 
is still the mainstream view. Denying a proposition just is asserting 
its negation. Two modern theories of negation, however, challenge 
this mainstream view. Firstly, dialetheists, and notably Priest (2006: 
Chapter 6), reject any intimate relationship between negation and 
denial whatsoever, a consequence of their wishing to admit the truth 
of both some propositions and their negations without committing 
themselves to the simultaneous assertion and denial of some proposi-
tions. Denial is interpreted as a sui generis speech act non-equivalent 
to any assertion, and consequently even the assertion of a negation 
is non-equivalent to any denial. In contrast, rejectivism agrees with 
Frege that there is an intimate relationship between negation and 
denial, but proposes that he was wrong to suppose that the denial of 
a proposition should be understood in terms of the assertion of its 
negation. Instead, the pragmatic concept of denial should have ex-
planatory primacy over the logical concept of negation, and thus the 
meaning of negation should fundamentally be understood in terms of 
the act of denial (Price 1990, Smiley 1996, Rumfitt 2000).
2 A challenge to rejectivism
Without taking a stand on which theory of negation is the most ten-
able overall, this paper offers a challenge to rejectivism, to dem-
onstrate that it is possible to construct a philosophically plausible 
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definition of ‘contradiction’ in terms of denial, with the consequence 
that any failure to do so will count against the theory’s explanatory 
power.
The motivation for our challenge arises from two suppositions: (i) 
That the concept of contradiction is partially explained in terms of 
negation, and (ii) The transitivity of explanations:
With any attempt to explain some phenomenon Y in terms of 
some phenomenon X, if it is generally accepted that a third phe-
nomenon Z should be (partially) explained in terms of Y, then it 
should be possible to (partially) explain Z in terms of X.
While our first supposition will be discussed in the following section, 
two points should sufficiently motivate our presupposing the transi-
tivity of explanations here, although they far from establish its truth. 
Firstly, the principle is generally assumed in discussions of causal 
explanations (Armstrong 1983: 40, Bird 2007: 86-87), and thus in 
supposing its truth here we are merely conforming to an assumption 
generally made within the literature. Secondly, we commonly use 
the principle when considering the plausibility of philosophical ex-
planations. For example, when proposing a truth-conditional theory 
of meaning we would expect the theory to be capable of explaining 
in terms of truth-conditions other phenomena which are partially 
explained in terms of meaning, such as synonymy and the identity 
of propositions. Any failure to do so would be seen to constitute an 
explanatory failure on the part of the theory. Consequently, we seem 
to be prima facie justified, at least, in presuming the transitivity of 
explanations for our purposes here.
In what follows we will suggest that, by appealing to the transitiv-
ity of explanations, rejectivism ought to be able to explain contradic-
tions in terms of denial (and assertion), given that the concept of ne-
gation partially constitutes the concept of contradiction. Any failure 
to achieve this will count against rejectivism’s explanatory power.
3 A pragmatic contradiction
Contradictions are traditionally understood as propositions of the form 
A ∧ ~A (Haack 1978: 244), which is to say that they are understood to be 
the conjunction of a proposition and its negation (Kalish et al. 1980: 18):
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(S) C is a contradiction iff C is the conjunction of a proposition 
and its negation.
While the fact that negation plays an integral role within the concept 
of contradiction is not troublesome for either the Fregean or diale-
theic theories of negation and denial, given that neither require that 
negation should be fundamentally understood in other terms, the 
situation is less simple for rejectivism. According to rejectivists, ne-
gation itself should fundamentally be understood in terms of denial. 
Thus, in conjunction with the transitivity of explanations and (S), the 
rejectivist’s theory entails that she ought to be able to understand the 
concept of contradiction partially in terms of denial.
In her quest to understand contradiction in terms of denial, how-
ever, it will not do for the rejectivist to simply substitute ‘denial’ for 
‘negation’ in the standard definition of contradiction, as she would 
intuitively wish to here:
(S') C is a contradiction iff C is the conjunction of a proposition 
and its denial.
Firstly, denial is a speech act. Yet, to speak of conjoining speech acts 
is totally inappropriate; as inappropriate as it is to speak of the nega-
tion or disjunction of speech acts. One conjoins propositional con-
tent, not the acts communicating propositional content. Secondly, 
to speak of a proposition and its denial commits a category mistake. 
Propositions themselves do not have denials. Denial is a speech act 
and propositions are meanings. While one can both deny or assert 
the truth of a proposition, this is different from the proposition itself 
having an assertion or denial as it does a contradictory. No proposi-
tion is the assertion or denial of another proposition (a point we will 
revisit below). Consequently, if the rejectivist is to successfully ex-
plain the concept of contradiction in terms of denial, she will require 
more than simply substituting ‘denial’ for ‘negation’ in the standard 
definition of contradiction.
The most plausible option here for the rejectivist given that, (i) 
denial is a speech act, (ii) the rejectivist explains negation in terms 
of denial, and (iii) the concept of negation partially constitutes the 
concept of contradiction, is to understand contradictions purely in 
terms of speech acts. After all, similarly to Frege, if the rejectivist 
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understands negation in terms of commitments, and particularly the 
speech act of denial, shouldn’t she similarly understand a proposition 
as a commitment, an assertion? This new interpretation of ‘contra-
diction’ in terms of denial and assertion seems to both conform to 
the rejectivist’s pragmatic principle of interpreting negation in terms 
of speech acts, and fits the practice of others who have attempted to 
explicate ‘contradiction’ in terms of denial, such as Howard Kahane 
and Peter Strawson:
A contradiction both makes a claim and denies that very claim. (Kah-
ane 1995: 308)
We would not say that a man could, in the same breath, assert and deny 
the same thing without contradiction. (Strawson 1993: 21)
Thus, instead of expressing the content constituting a contradiction, 
the communicative acts themselves constitute the contradiction. 
The assertion is not an assertion of a contradiction, but the act of as-
sertion and denial is itself a contradiction.
Removing the unnecessary ambiguities from Kahane’s and 
Strawson’s definitions, we arrive at a precise pragmatic definition of 
‘contradiction’:
(P) C is a contradiction iff C is the simultaneous assertion and 
denial of some proposition p.
The condition in (P) that the assertion and denial of p must be simul-
taneous is included to ensure that assertions of p that are renounced 
and replaced by denials of p, and vice versa, are not categorized as 
instances of contradiction. One certainly does not contradict oneself 
if they simply change their mind. Thus, (P) does not require that the 
acts of assertion and denial occur simultaneously, only that the asser-
tion/denial of p fails to annul the previous denial/assertion of p in the 
case of contradictions.
Now, according to the transitivity of explanations, given that the 
rejectivist wishes to explain negation in terms of denial, she ought 
to be able to explain contradictions in terms of a definition such as 
(P). Consequently, when assessing the success of rejectivism as an 
explanation of negation, we ought to evaluate the plausibility of de-
fining contradictions in terms of speech acts, such as attempted in 
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(P). However, before we move on to assessing (P)’s plausibility as a 
definition of ‘contradiction’, two clarifications over its content are 
required.
Firstly, both assertion and denial are communicative acts that 
only agents perform. Non-agents do not themselves assert or deny. 
Truthbearers, for example, are the contents to be asserted or denied, 
and are not the acts themselves. Consequently, the occurrence of a 
sentence s expressing a proposition p does not constitute an asser-
tion of p, or a denial of another proposition q. Three points should 
clarify why. Firstly, treating s as an assertion of p would ensure that 
one could never just mention or hypothesize p with the use of s, as 
by using s one would be automatically asserting p. Thus, the fact 
that one can mention or hypothesize the truth of a proposition p 
with the use of a sentence s expressing p demonstrates that a sen-
tence s’s expressing a proposition p does not constitute assertion of 
p. Secondly, one can assert a proposition p by asserting a sentence 
s that expresses p, yet if s just is the assertion of p then one would 
be asserting an assertion of p in such a scenario. However, this both 
misrepresents what one achieves when one uses a sentence to assert 
a proposition, and requires us to admit that force operators can be 
embedded, a commitment we have good reasons to reject. The same 
point holds if we hypothesize that a sentence s denies a proposition 
q. Lastly, acts of assertion and denial bring with them some form 
of social commitment (Brandom 1994: 157-180, Williamson 2000: 
266-269), a commitment which sentences are not the right kind of 
objects to possess. To have social commitment, an object must be a 
social entity. Therefore, a contradiction, according to (P), must be a 
communicative act by an agent.
Secondly, a full evaluation of (P) would require being sure of 
the correct theories of assertion and denial to embed within (P). 
However, firstly, given that we are primarily concerned here with 
the commitments of the rejectivist, and there is neither any obvious 
consensus among rejectivists on how denial (and assertion) should 
be conceived, nor an obvious interpretation of denial to which re-
jectivists are committed, it would be unfair to ascribe a particular 
theory of denial or assertion to the rejectivist for the sake of our 
evaluating (P). Secondly, given the plethora of substantive theories of 
assertion available in the literature, it clearly is not viable for us here 
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to evaluate the accounts as a precursor to evaluating (P)’s adequacy. 
Our only reasonable option then is to acknowledge the plethora of 
available theories in the literature (see MacFarlane 2011), and sus-
pend judgement on which is correct.
While our lack of a commitment on the correct theory of asser-
tion and denial to embed within (P) ensures that our evaluation of 
the definition is bound to be incomplete, there are enough properties 
that any plausible account of assertion must apply to assertion (and 
denial) to enable us to suitably evaluate (P)’s adequacy as a defini-
tion of ‘contradiction’ — notably, the fundamental property of being 
speech acts.
4 Evaluating (P)
In what follows we will evaluate attempts to define ‘contradiction’ 
in pragmatic terms, such as (P), using the standard criteria for a suc-
cessful scientific definition (Belnap 1993). Namely, that the defini-
tions are neither too lax nor strict in their categorization of con-
tradictions, that the definiens and the definiendum can be substituted 
for one another salva veritate in non-opaque contexts, and that the 
definitions reflect the actual use of the term by the philosophical 
community. We concentrate here on three reasons to believe that 
(P), or any other definition of ‘contradiction’ in terms of speech-
acts, is implausible, whichever viable theory of assertion and denial 
we embed within it.
Firstly, (P) precludes the possibility of an individual asserting/
denying or (dis)believing a contradiction. One (dis)believes, asserts 
or denies truthbearers, which have propositional content, and not 
communicative acts, which assertion and denial are. Communicative 
acts can express truthbearers, but not other communicative acts. It 
makes no sense to say that one has asserted an assertion, denied a 
denial, asserted a denial, or the inverse. Similarly, to say that some-
one believes an assertion only makes sense if we interpret the claim 
loosely as ‘Someone believes a proposition p, which was previously 
asserted’. Yet, we believe that individuals can both assert (or deny) 
and (dis)believe a contradiction. Additionally, we believe that these 
acts can be meaningfully expressed when we use the term ‘contra-
diction’ instead of the intended pragmatic definiens of (P). While the 
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propositions ‘Someone has asserted a contradiction’ and ‘Someone 
believes a contradiction’ are perfectly meaningful, substituting the 
definiens of (P) for ‘contradiction’ in either proposition ensures it be-
comes meaningless. (P), therefore, fails the criterion of eliminability 
in non-opaque contexts that is so crucial to any good definition of a 
term.
Secondly, assertions and denials cannot themselves be true or 
false, yet it is perfectly meaningful to say of a contradiction that it is 
false. Assertion and denial are not truthbearers, as we have already 
noted. Therefore, they cannot be assigned a truth-value. Instead, 
they are communicative acts that have truthbearers as their content. 
The definiens of (P) fails again to preserve the meaningfulness of cer-
tain propositions when it replaces the definiendum ‘contradiction’. 
This failure brings us suitably onto our third criticism of (P) — its 
inability to produce a plausible version of the Law of Non-Contra-
diction (LNC).
A main criterion for the plausibility of any definition of contradic-
tion should be whether the definition can be meaningfully embedded 
into the LNC whilst ensuring the law’s philosophical importance. 
The pertinence of this feature of contradictions, as a criterion for a 
definition’s plausibility, is ensured by: (a) the perceived philosophical 
importance of the LNC, and (b) the fact that the LNC contains the 
concept of contradiction within it.
On the former point, historically the LNC has held an elevated 
position as one of the three most philosophically important logi-
cal laws, with Aristotle (1984: Γ 1005b22) considering it to be the 
most certain of all principles. The continued vaulted status of the 
law in contemporary philosophy is demonstrated by both the vast 
majority of the philosophical community rejecting the possibility 
of true contradictions, and the law still being given mention in in-
troductory logic textbooks as a fundamental logical law. The prima 
facie plausible position, therefore, is that the LNC has philosophical 
importance.
Our latter point, that the LNC contains the concept of contra-
diction within it, if not obvious from the occurrence of the term 
‘contradiction’ in its name, can be shown by formulations of the law 
in the literature:
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Aristotle (1984: Γ 1011b13-14): Contradictory statements are not 
at the same time true.
Brown (2004: 126): No contradictory sentence is ever correctly 
assertable.
Dummett (1978: xix): Not both A and not A.
Englebretsen (1981: 5): A sentence and its negation cannot both 
be true.
Smith (2003: 101): A proposition and its negation cannot both 
be true.
Although only two of the formulations explicitly use the terms ‘con-
tradiction’ or ‘contradictory’, those which don’t include the concept 
under the guise of a particular definition of ‘contradiction’, notably 
here the definition of contradictions as conjunctions of propositions 
and their respective negations.
The LNC, therefore, is both a logical law of great philosophical 
import and contains the concept of contradiction. Consequently, for 
a definition of ‘contradiction’ to be philosophically plausible, it must 
respect both of these facts by ensuring that it is meaningfully embed-
dable into a plausible interpretation of the LNC.
There are two broad interpretations of the LNC. The first is as 
a semantic law, as in Englebretsen 1981: 5, stating a semantic fact 
about contradictions, and the second as a pragmatic law, stating what 
one shouldn’t assert or believe, as in Brown 2004: 126.1 For reasons 
already given, the latter interpretation of the LNC is not appropri-
ate to embed the definiens of (P). The pragmatic versions of the LNC 
‘Do not assert contradictions’ or ‘One ought not to assert contradic-
tions’ make little sense when contradictions are defined in terms of 
speech acts themselves. Consequently, if (P) is to be meaningfully 
embeddable into a version of the LNC, it will have to be a semantic 
1 While there is the third option of interpreting the LNC as a metaphysical 
law, as in Tahko 2009, this possibility will not be considered here as there are 
good independent reasons to believe the metaphysical interpretation of the law 
too narrow to offer an adequate general account of a fundamental logical law 
(Martin 2014: section 3.4).
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interpretation of the law.
Unfortunately for the rejectivist, the most obvious and prima fa-
cie plausible semantic interpretations of the LNC, ‘All contradictions 
are false’ or ‘No contradictions are true’ cannot meaningfully embed 
(P) for the reason that speech acts are not the right kind of ontological 
entities to be true or false. Thus, we will need to extend our reaches 
to more obscure interpretations of the law if we are to accommodate 
(P). Yet, the difficulty with these interpretations, such as,
(LNCW) All contradictions are wrong
(LNCI) All contradictions are incorrect
(LNCM) All contradictions are mistaken,
is that their suitability to capture the LNC’s content is dubious. 
While we can meaningfully embed the definiens of (P) into them all, 
(LNCWP) All simultaneous assertions and denials of a proposi-
tion are wrong
(LNCIP) All simultaneous assertions and denials of a proposi-
tion are incorrect
(LNCMP) All simultaneous assertions and denials of a proposi-
tion are mistaken,
they fail as plausible interpretations of the LNC for other reasons.
Any adequate version of the LNC must fulfil at least two criteria. 
Firstly, it must be meaningful for the definiendum ‘contradiction’ to 
replace the proposed definiens embedded within the version of the 
LNC. Secondly, the version of the LNC must either respect the stan-
dard formalization of the law, or present a new formalization while 
explaining away the success of its predecessor.
All of (LNCWP), (LNCIP), and (LNCMP) fail to fulfil the first crite-
rion. As we can see from (LNCW), (LNCI), and (LNCM), ‘contradic-
tion’ cannot meaningfully replace the definiens of (P) in any of these 
versions of the LNC. It makes no sense to say that contradictions 
themselves are wrong, incorrect, or mistaken. If it is meaningful 
to say that contradictions are false, which undoubtedly it is, then 
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contradictions must be truthbearers of some kind. Truthbearers 
themselves, however, are the wrong kind of entity to be wrong, in-
correct, or mistaken.
The obstacle to providing an interpretation of the LNC that is 
both suited to (P) and can meaningfully embed the definiendum ‘con-
tradiction’ is that fundamentally speech acts and truthbearers are 
such different entities. Generally, semantic properties which we can 
meaningfully apply to members of one category cannot be meaning-
fully applied to members of the other. While we have not precluded 
here the possibility of (P)’s advocates constructing an interpretation 
of the LNC which is meaningful when embedding both the definien-
dum and definiens of (P), we have at least provided prima facie evi-
dence that the possibility of constructing such a version of the law is 
unlikely. The onus then is on the rejectivist to provide such an inter-
pretation of the LNC if she wishes to show that we can account for 
the concept of contradiction in terms of assertion and denial. Let us 
provisionally conclude, therefore, that the available interpretations 
of the LNC which can meaningfully embed the definiens of (P) seem 
to fail the first criterion of any plausible version of the LNC by failing 
to be able to meaningfully embed (P)’s definiendum.
All of (LNCWP), (LNCIP), and (LNCMP) equally fail to fulfil the 
second criterion for any plausible version of the LNC. The standard 
formalization of the law, ~(A ∧ ~A), places two restrictions on any 
informal interpretation of the LNC, both of which are problematic 
for all of (LNCW), (LNCI), and (LNCM). Firstly, the law must contain 
propositions that can be embedded into more complex propositions, 
due to the presence of embedded sub-formulae and truth-functors 
in the schema. Secondly, the law must contain two instances of the 
same truth-function, given that the schema contains two tildes.
All three interpretations of the LNC above fail to meet the first 
restriction. They define contradictions as a combination of acts, 
formalized as force operators, which cannot be meaningfully em-
bedded, rather than as a combination of propositions, which can be 
meaningfully embedded. Similarly, the interpretations fail to meet 
the second restriction, as there are no two instances of the same 
truth-function in any of (LNCW), (LNCI), or (LNCM) to account for 
the two tildes in the schema. Even if we assume that A ∧ ~A is a 
plausible formalization of the assertion and denial of a proposition, 
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which we have good reasons to deny for the reasons already given, 
we would be required by formal constraints to interpret the outer 
tilde as a denial operator, given that the internal tilde (we can sup-
pose) would symbolize denial. Thus, the only available interpreta-
tion of the LNC embedding the definiens of (P) which meets this sec-
ond formal constraint would be,
(LNCDP) One should deny all simultaneous assertions and de-
nials of a proposition,
which is meaningless for the reasons already given. It makes no sense 
to deny an assertion or denial. Thus, none of the interpretations of 
the LNC discussed above are reasonable informal representations of 
the standard formalization of the LNC.
Now, given how established ~(A ∧ ~A) is as the formalization of 
the LNC, any definition of ‘contradiction’ that cannot respect this 
formalization must possess substantial theoretical virtues in order 
to justify its replacement. At present, however, (P) doesn’t seem to 
possess any of the theoretical virtues required to justify such a diver-
gence from the established path. In fact, it seems a relatively theo-
retically weak definition of ‘contradiction’. Thus, we can reasonably 
conclude that none of the interpretations of the LNC above that can 
meaningfully embed the definiens of (P) are adequate, for they all 
fail to fulfil at least two criteria for any adequate version of the law. 
Consequently, given the importance of the role that the concept of 
contradiction plays within the LNC, and the importance of the LNC 
within both philosophy and logic, (P)’s failure to produce an ade-
quate version of the LNC must count heavily against the definition.2
2 We can also show that it is unlikely any version of the LNC that meaningfully 
embeds the definiens of (P) can produce an acceptable formalization of the LNC, 
which, given the criteria for any adequate version of the LNC above, subsequently 
demonstrates that it is unlikely any adequate version of the LNC can meaningfully 
embed the definiens of (P). For a version of the LNC that meaningfully embeds the 
definiens of (P) to produce an acceptable formalization of the LNC, at least one of 
three very plausible principles must be rejected:
(For) Assertion and denial are formalized as force operators.
(Emb) Force operators cannot be meaningfully embedded.
(Fun) The LNC should be formalized as a function on contradictions.
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We have considered three substantial problems with proposing a 
definition of ‘contradiction’ in terms of denial and assertion. What 
can the rejectivist say in reply to these concerns? Given the quantity 
and conclusiveness of the reasons for rejecting (P) as a definition of 
‘contradiction’, it seems the rejectivist must concentrate on persuad-
ing us that, contrary to appearances, she is not committed to endors-
ing a definition of ‘contradiction’ in terms of speech acts. This she 
could achieve through, at least, two means.
Firstly, she could argue that contradictions should not be under-
stood as the conjunction of a proposition and its negation, but rather 
in truth-conditional terms, for example, and thus neither negation 
nor denial play any role in the definition of ‘contradiction’. This is 
undoubtedly a live option for the rejectivist, however in this case the 
onus is on her to establish the viability of this competing definition of 
‘contradiction’, and for independent reasons we should be sceptical 
that she can achieve this (Martin 2014: Chapter 3).
Secondly, she could propose that although she explains negation 
in terms of denial, and negation plays a fundamental role within the 
concept of contradiction, she is not committed to a definition of 
‘contradiction’ in terms of speech acts such as (P), nor even showing 
that it is possible to construct such a plausible pragmatic definition of 
‘contradiction’. Although we cannot preclude the possibility of such 
a response here, the principle underlying the response seems dubi-
ous. If we attempt to explain some phenomenon P, and we are very 
aware that P is used in explaining some further phenomenon Q , why 
would we wish our insight regarding P not to likewise provide an 
insight into the nature of Q? Doing so surely restricts the explanatory 
power of our proposed theory, by restricting our explanation of P to 
cases where P is not embedded within wider contexts. Perhaps there 
is a principled reason to be wary of expecting our explanations of 
some phenomenon P to always being suitable to embed within expla-
nations of further phenomena that we have implicated P into, how-
ever no reason for such doubts is transparent at present. Thus, if the 
rejectivist wishes to take this second route in meeting the challenge 
Given the plausibility of all three, the prospects of (P), or other definitions 
of ‘contradiction’ in terms of speech acts, producing an adequate version of the 
LNC seem grim.
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set by the inadequacy of (P) as a definition of ‘contradiction’, then she 
will need to provide us with reason to believe that a theory of nega-
tion should not inform our definition of ‘contradiction’ even though 
the concept of negation is an important component of the concept of 
contradiction.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have set rejectivism a challenge — to provide an 
adequate definition of ‘contradiction’ in terms of denial — and then 
advanced reasons to believe it cannot be successfully met. Given 
this, to meet our objection that she ought to be able to construct 
such a definition, the rejectivist must account for the apparent in-
adequacy of definitions of ‘contradiction’ in terms of speech acts by 
either demonstrating that the concept of negation fails to play a role 
in the definition of ‘contradiction’ or providing us with reasons to 
doubt the validity of the transitivity of explanations. While rejectivism’s 
apparent failure to explain contradictions in terms of speech acts 
fails to provide us with a reason to outright reject the theory, as this 
requires demonstrating the adequacy of some competing theory, it 
does provide the rejectivist with a challenge to overcome if she is to 
show that her theory is ultimately a successful explanatory account 
of negation.
Ben Martin
Dept. of Philosophy
University College London
London WC1E 6BT, UK
benjamin.martin@ucl.ac.uk
References
Aristotle. Metaphysics. In The Complete Works of Aristotle, edited by J. Barnes. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.
Armstrong, David. 1983. What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Belnap, Nuel. 1993. Rigorous definitions. Philosophical Studies 72: 115-146.
Bird, Alexander. 2007. Nature’s Metaphysics: Laws and Properties. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
267Rejectivism and the Challenge of Pragmatic Contradictions
Brandom, Robert. 1994. Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive 
Commitment. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Brown, Bryson. 2004. Knowledge and non-contradiction. In The Law of Non-
Contradiction: New Philosophical Essays, edited by G. Priest, Jc. Beall and B. 
Armour-Garb. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Dummett, Michael. 1978. Truth and Other Enigmas. London: Duckworth.
Englebretsen, George. 1981. Logical Negation. Assen: Van Gorcum.
Frege, Gottlob. 1879-1891. Logic. In Posthumous Writings, translated by P. 
Long and R. White, edited by H. Hermes, F. Kambartel and F. Kaulbach. 
Oxford: Blackwell, 1979.
Frege, Gottlob. 1919. Negation. In Translations from the Philosophical Writings of 
Gottlob Frege, edited by P. Geach and M. Black. Oxford: University College 
London Press, 1960.
Frege, Gottlob. 1980. Philosophical and Mathematical Correspondence. Translated by 
H. Kaal, edited by G. Gabriel, H. Hermes, F. Kambartel, C. Thiel and A. 
Veraart. Oxford: Blackwell.
Haack, Susan. 1978. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
Kahane, Howard. 1995. Logic and Contemporary Rhetoric (7th ed.) Belmont: 
Wadsworth.
Kalish, Donald; Montague, Richard and Mar, Gary. 1980. Logic: Techniques of 
Formal Reasoning (2nd ed.) New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
MacFarlane, John. 2011. What is assertion? In Assertion: New Philosophical Essays, 
edited by J. Brown and H. Cappelen. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Martin, Ben. 2014. The Logical and Philosophical Foundations of True Contradictions 
(PhD thesis). London: University College London.
Price, Huw. 1990. Why ‘not’? Mind 99: 221-238.
Priest, Graham. 2006. In Contradiction: A Study of the Transconsistent (2nd ed.) 
Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Rumfitt, Ian. 2000. ‘Yes’ and ‘no’. Mind 109: 781-823.
Smiley, Timothy. 1996. Rejection. Analysis 56: 1-9.
Smith, Peter. 2003. An Introduction to Formal Logic. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Strawson, Peter F. 1993. Logical appraisal. In A Philosophical Companion to First-
Order Logic, edited by R. I. G. Hughes. Indianapolis: Hackett.
Tahko, Tuomas E. 2009. The law of non-contradiction as a metaphysical 
principle. Australasian Journal of Logic 7: 32-47.
Williamson, Timothy. 2000. Knowledge and its Limits. Oxford: Blackwell.

